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Safe Port and Berth Provisions in Time
Charter Agreements: Apportioning Liability
to Deter Accidents and Minimize Costs
STEVEN M. RUBIN*
This article surveys the safe port and berth provisions that
typically are found in charter party agreements. The author
argues that courts and arbitrators often interpret these provi-
sions unpredictably and inconsistently, creating uncertainty in
maritime transactions. The author concludes by proposing a
solution to this problem and offers a model safe berth provision
that the parties to a charter should incorporate into their
agreement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The perils of the sea are legend;1 the perils of safe port and
berth2 provisions in charter party agreements are not as widely
known. Typically, charter party agreements contain one of these
provisions. Interpretation of these provisions by courts and arbi-
trators determine whether the charterer or the owner is liable for
damages that a vessel may sustain while entering, using, or leaving
* A.B. (1976), Brown University; J.D. (1979), University of Southern California; Mem-
ber of the California and the District of Columbia Bars; Associate with Kaplan Russin &
Vecchi, Washington, D.C.
1. See, e.g., HOMER, THE ODYSSEY (W. Shewring trans. 1980).
2. The terms "port" and "berth" will be used interchangeably in this article unless the
context requires otherwise.
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a port. This article considers the safe port and berth provisions
found in these agreements and discusses the constructions that
courts and arbitrators have given them. With this background in
mind, this article examines the development and effect of several
ancillary doctrines that the courts and arbitrators have applied to
these provisions.
Analysis of the numerous problems inherent in safe berth pro-
visions and their related legal doctrines demonstrates the law's
failure to achieve the objectives that the contracting parties in-
tended the safe berth provisions to serve. These provisions and
their related legal doctrines frequently do not provide predictabil-
ity and orderliness in the administration of marine operations con-
ducted under a charter party agreement. Furthermore, they often
fail to apportion fairly liability in accordance with responsibility
for the injuries a vessel may sustain. This situation is highly unde-
sirable because it does not provide the proper incentive for the
avoidance of unnecessary injury to a vessel while at berth. This
article proposes a solution to these problems and demonstrates this
proposal's ability to achieve order and predictability in the admin-
istration of charter party affairs, to apportion liability fairly, and
to minimize the occurrence of injuries to vessels while at berth.
II. SAFE BERTH PROVISIONS
Courts and arbitration panels confront two distinct problems
in interpreting safe berth provisions as they typically appear in
charter party agreements. First, the decisionmakers must deter-
mine the standard of care that the provision requires. Second, they
must determine the meaning of a safe port or berth in the context
of the litigation or arbitration. These two problems of interpreta-
tion should be discussed separately.
A. Standards of Care
Safe berths provisions in time charters take a variety of forms.
For example, the proceeding in The M.V. Oceanic First4 revolved
around the following provision in the New York Produce Exchange
3. "A 'berth' is the location where the loading and discharging operation occurs. It may
include a dock, anchorage, offshore mooring, or may be alongside another vessel. Addition-
ally, the approaches to a berth may be included in its definition." Smith, Time and Voyage
Charter: Safe Port/Safe Berth, 49 TUL. L. Rzv. 860, 861 (1975).
4. Oceanic Freighters Corp. v. Louis Dreyfus Corp. (The M.V. Oceanic First), S.M.A.
No. 1054 (Arb. at N.Y. 1976). See generally M. WILLFORD, T. COGHLIN & N. HEALY, TIME
CHARTES 86-89 (1975) [hereinafter cited as TIME CHARTERS].
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Type Time Charter Form:
That the cargo or cargoes be laden and/or discharged in
any dock or at any wharf or place that Charterers or their
Agents may direct provided the vessel can safely lie al-
ways afloat at any time of tide .... 5
Charter party agreements frequently contain this or a similar pro-
vision. Courts and arbitrators usually interpret the requirement
that a vessel be able to "safely lie always afloat" as an express war-
ranty of safe berth running from the charterer to the vessel owner.6
The charterer's warranty embodies an express undertaking or
assurance on which the shipowner has the right to rely that the
vessel "could proceed to discharge her cargo and depart from the
port and that in the absence of some abnormal and unforeseen oc-
currence and given good navigation and seamanship this could be
done without undue risk of physical damage to the vessel."'7 The
warranty therefore represents a charterer's assurance of safety in
the approach to, use of, and departure from, a berth. If a ship-
owner shows that the berth was unsafe," the express assurance is
contravened, and the charterer is liable for damages caused by the
berth's unsafe conditions.0
Although the warranty construction of the term "safely lie al-
ways afloat" is generally well-established, 10 it occasionally has been
5. The M.V. Oceanic First, S.M.A. No. 1054, at 2 (emphasis added).
6. See, e.g., Venore Transp. Co. v. Oswego Shipping Corp., 498 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974); Paragon Oil Co. v. Republic Tankers, S.A., 310 F.2d 169 (2d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 967 (1963); Park S.S. Co. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 188 F.2d
804 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 862 (1951); Athina Shipping Co. v. Amerada Hess Corp.,
1972 A.M.C. 796 (M.D. Fla. 1971); Universal Tramp Shipping Co. v. Irish Salt Mining Co.,
1970 A.M.C. 1783 (D. Mass.); Red Star Barge Line v. Lizza Asphalt Constr. Co., 164 F.
Supp. 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd, 264 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1959); Appeal of the United States
Lines, 1977 A.M.C. 318, 335 (Armed Servs. Bd. Contract App. 1976). See generally Timi
CHARTERS, supra note 4, at 86. The historical derivation of the warranty rule is examined in
Smith, supra note 3, at 862-69. An analysis of other warranties in time charter agreements
appears in Barak, Time Charters: Who Bears the Burden of Complying with Subsequent
Legislation-The Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, 16 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 271 (1982).
7. The M.V. Oceanic First, S.M.A. No. 1054, at 5; see A. MOCATrA, M. MUSTILL & S.
BOYD, SCRUTTON ON CHARTER PARTIES AND BILLS OF LADING 122-23 (18th ed. 1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as SCRuTrON ON CHARTER PARTIES]; TIME CHARTERS, supra note 4, at 86-89.
8. For a discussion of the legal implications of the term "safe berth," see infra notes 26-
54 and accompanying text.
9. TIME CHARTERS, supra note 4, at 86-89. In actual practice, however, a determination
of liability is usually much more complicated. See infra notes 55-117 and accompanying
text.
10. See Paragon Oil Co. v. Republic Tankers, S.A., 310 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 967 (1963).
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criticized." According toa minority position, "the safe berth ap-
pears merely to exonerate the owner from any duty to berth the
vessel at a place its master deems unsafe.' 2 The minority reasons
that unless a shipowner or his representative, the master, refuses
to berth at a designated location, the shipowner alone will be re-
sponsible for any injuries to the vessel caused by its berth."
Some safe berth provisions either eliminate the term "safely
lie always afloat," or emphasize that the term is not of central im-
portance to the provision. The arbitrators in The S.T. Hilda,4 for
example, interpreted a "due diligence" provision.' Under these
clauses, the shipowner must prove not only that a berth is unsafe,
but also that in ordering a vessel to the berth the charterers failed
to exercise due diligence.' Because arbitrators rely heavily on pre-
vailing maritime customs and practices, the panels usually give
this term a more summary treatment than it receives in other con-
texts.' 7 Apparently, however, the parties often intend "due dili-
11. See, e.g., G. GnLMoRz & C. BLACK, Tiz LAw op ADMIRALTY 202-07 (2d ed. 1975); see
also Bunge Corp. v. MV Furness Bridge, 396 F. Supp. 852, 858 (E.D. La. 1975), aff'd in part,
558 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1977) (describing two conflicting interpretations of safe berth provi-
sions), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978).
12. Bunge Corp. v. MV Furness Bridge, 396 F. Supp. at 858.
13. G. GILMoRE & C. BLACK, supra note 11, at 206-07.
14. Victoria Transp. Corp. v. Antco Shipping Co. (The S.T. Hilda), S.M.A. No. 1196
(Arb. at N.Y. 1978).
15. The provision in S.T. Hilda stated,
Charterer shall exercise due diligence to ensure that the vessel is only em-
ployed between and at safe ports, places, berths, docks.... Charterer shall not
be deemed to warrant the safety of any port, place, berth, dock... and shall be
under no liability in respect thereof except for loss or damage caused by its fail-
ure to exercise due diligence as aforesaid.
Id. at 2. A similar provision is found in a standard charter party form:
The Vessel shall be loaded, discharged, or lightened, at any port, place,
berth, dock, anchorage, or submarine line or alongside lighters or lightening ves-
sels as Charterer may direct. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Clause
or any other provisions of this Charter, Charterer shall not be deemed to war-
rant the safety of any port, berth, dock, anchorage, and/or submarine line and
shall not be liable for any loss, damage, injury, or delay resulting from conditions
at such ports, berths, docks, anchorages, and submarine lines not caused by
Charterer's fault or neglect or which could have been avoided by the exercise of
reasonable care on the part of the Master or Owner.
STB Form of Tanker Time Charter, reprinted in TinZ CHARTERS, supra note 4, at xxviii,
xlxi.
16. See The S.T. Hilda, S.M.A. No. 1196, at 7; see also Aquarian Navigation Ltd. v.
Clark Oil & Ref. Corp. (The Athenoula), S.M.A. No. 1413 (Arb. at N.Y. 1980) (charterers
did not fail to exercise due diligence because grounding of vessel not caused by a naviga-
tional hazard).
17. Compare cases cited supra note 16 (summary treatment of due diligence) with
Grand Trunk Ry. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408 (1891) (what constitutes care and prudence will vary
[Vol. 36:465
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gence" to impose a negligence standard of care, rather than strict
liability for breach of warranty."8
In addition to the interpretational difficulties posed by the
terms "safely lie always afloat" and "due diligence," the safe berth
clauses in some instances display even more ambiguity. The clause
below, for example, appears to repudiate warranty and embrace in-
stead a standard of prudence-but this interpretation is certainly
not an inevitable result of the provision's wording:
(A) The Vessel shall be employed in lawful offshore activities
restricted to the services stated in box 12 and on voyages be-
tween any good and safe port or place and any place or offshore
unit where the Vessel can safely lie always afloat within the
trading limits indicated ... provided always (i) that the Char-
terers do not warrant the safety of any such port or place or
offshore units but shall act with prudence in the orders to Vessel
as if the Vessel were their own property and having regard to
her capabilities in the nature of her employment, (ii) Charterers
shall be responsible for any loss or damage sustained by the
Vessel by reason of the condition of berth or offshore unit.19
The terms "prudence" and "due diligence" both presumably re-
present a negligence standard of liability, but this conclusion is
neither apparent from the language of the provision nor directly
supported by the prominent treatises on the subject.2 0
The absence of a safe berth provision, however, does not pre-
clude the implication of a warranty in the charter party agreement.
In The Atlantis, 21 the agreement contained no safe berth provision
per se, but instead allowed the consignee discretion to order the
vessel to a "second safe wharf or berth if required. ' 22 After the
vessel grounded at its designated port, Piraeus, Greece, a panel of
the Society of Maritime Arbitrators quickly dismissed this ambigu-
ous provision: "[Ilt is debatable whether the reference to a second
safe berth implies that the first is also safe. It may also be inter-
under different circumstances).
18. Cf. Union Metal Co. v. Rondondo Shipping Co. (The M/V Grigoroussa), S.M.A. No.
1424 (Arb. at N.Y. 1980) (relying on SCRutrrON ON CHRTmE PARTIEs, supra note 7, at 423)
(describing owner's duty to discover "latent defects" under a "due diligence" provision).
19. The clause is one of endless variations of a standard charter party form. See gener-
ally Baltic and International Maritime Conference Uniform Time Charter Party for Off-
shore Service Vessels, reprinted in TIME CHARTERS, supra note 4, at xxiv.
20. Cf. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 149-80 (4th ed. 1971) (analysis of
the reasonable man of ordinary prudence).
21. Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece (The Atlantis), S.M.A. No. 788 (Arb.
at N.Y. 1972).
22. Id. at 4.
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preted to mean that the second berth must be safe, the first being
known to both parties to be safe.""3 Nevertheless, the panel did
not find significant the absence of a safe berth provision warrant-
ing that the vessel could lie safely afloat. The panel reasoned that
the "safety of the port, even if not warranted verbatim, is always
implied and the liability for damages due to unsafety depends
upon the knowledge of the parties." '24 In relieving the charterer of
warranty liability, however, the panel relied on the owner's famili-
arity with both the port and the particular wharf at which the At-
lantis docked."
B. The Meaning of the Term "Safe Berth"
Courts and arbitrators also have had difficulty determining
whether a particular berth is "safe." Ordinarily, a berth is safe if a
vessel can approach, use, and depart from the berth without undue
risk of physical damage, given good navigation, seamanship, and
the absence of some abnormal or unforeseen occurrence.2" This
definition is easier to state than to apply. Although the courts and
arbitrators have attempted to give the term a precise meaning,
many questions remain unanswered.
1. SAFETY IN APPROACH AND DEPARTURE
A safe port or berth is one in which the approach and depar-
ture is unobstructed. Accordingly, a vessel must be able to enter its
berth fully laden with cargo, discharge the cargo, load new cargo,
and depart without touching ground. 7 Thus, the depth of a port is
23. Id. at 9.
24. Id.
25. The panel explained its holding as follows:
[T]he Panel does not attribute great importance to the fact that the Charter
Party does not warrant the Port of Piraeus to be safe or that the Vessel shall be
always afloat. But it attributes particular significance to the fact that Piraeus is
named in the Charter Party and that there is only one grain berth thereat where
vessels of the "ATLANTIS" size can discharge fully laden, which is commonly
known to the entire trade. Also to the fact that representative of the Owners
inspected the known berth before the arrival of the Vessel and was fully satisfied
after the dredging. Were he not satisfied, he could veto the berthing of the ship
and request the application of the lighterage clause.
Id. (emphasis in original). In this respect, the decision resembles another arbitration award
that also invoked the doctrine of assumption of risk, without ever denoting it as such. See
Consorico Naviera Peruana, S.A. v. Amerop Corp. (The Zaneta), 1970 A.M.C. 807 (Arb. at
N.Y.); see also infra text accompanying notes 67-69.
26. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., The Gazelle, 128 U.S. 474 (1888); Carbon Slate Co. v. Ennis, 114 F. 260
[Vol. 36:465
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an important factor in determining its safety. In The Gazelle,'2 for
example, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a port
was unsafe because a sandbar obstructed its entry.29 One arbitra-
tion panel even concluded that a berth or port may be rendered
unsafe when it is not possible to ascertain accurately the depths of
its waters.30
Underwater and overwater objects may also render a berth un-
safe. In Mencke v. A Cargo of Java Sugar,"' the Supreme Court
concluded that a berth beyond the Brooklyn Bridge was unsafe for
a ship with masts too high to permit it to sail underneath the
bridge. 2 Similarly, in The MIS Silvercove,3 a panel of the Society
of Maritime Arbitrators held the charterers liable when an under-
water object adjacent to the ship's berth damaged the rudder.3 4
A port or berth must also be safe for the particular vessel
named in a charter party.35 The vessel's size is therefore an impor-
tant factor in determining the safety of the berth. A berth that is
safe for one vessel may be unsafe for another.3 6
2. SAFETY IN USE
A berth must provide not only a safe approach and departure,
but also must have characteristics that enable a vessel to use it
safely. Weather conditions, for example, are often a source of in-
jury to a vessel at berth. Although in unusual instances weather
conditions may render a berth unsafe as a matter of law, 7 this is
(3d Cir. 1902); Crisp v. United States & Australasia S.S. Co., 124 F. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1903); see
also Neptune Maritime Co. v. Cook Indus. (The N.V. Naiad), S.M.A. No. 1177 (Arb. at N.Y.
1977) (safe port warranty encompasses entrance to river as well as to berth along the river).
These cases are discussed in TIME CHARTERS, supra note 4, at 86-87.
28. 128 U.S. 474 (1888).
29. Id. at 485-86.
30. Astrodevoto Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Carbonavi (The Eastern Eagle), 1971
A.M.C. 236 (Arb. at N.Y. 1970).
31. 187 U.S. 248 (1902).
32. Id. at 257. In Mencke the Court held the charterers liable for the expense of lighter-
age from the vessel to a dock below the Brooklyn Bridge.
33. Silverline Ltd. v. Seabord [sic] Shipping Co. (The M/S Silvercove), S.M.A. No. 813
(Arb. at N.Y. 1973).
34. Id. at 4. In The MIS Silvercove, tugboats damaged the vessel while pushing it from
the pier.
35. See Consorico Naviera Peruana, S.A. v. Amerop Corp. (The Zaneta), 1970 A.M.C.
807, 808 (Arb. at N.Y. 1970). In The Zaneta, the owners were not allowed to collect damages
from the charterers because they should have known that the vessel could not proceed ac-
cording to the contract.
36. TIME CHARTERS, supra note 4, at 86.
37. See, e.g., Oceanic Freighters Corp. v. Louis Dreyfus Corp. (The M.V. Oceanic First),
19821
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not the general rule. As the panel of arbitrators in The S.S. Stadt
Schleswig3 stated, "Major ports can become temporarily unsafe,
as a result of storms and hurricanes, tidal waves and other acts of
God. This does not per se make it unsafe or entitle that label at
any given moment."3 9 Courts and arbitrators ordinarily will not
find a breach of the safe berth warranty when a storm has dam-
aged a vessel at berth, because a storm is simply "one of the perils
of the sea" for which a charterer cannot be held responsible. 0
Charterers nonetheless may be held liable for injuries to a ves-
sel resulting from damaged bumpers or fenders insulating the pe-
rimeters of a berth. For example, the panel in Appeal of the
United States Lines41 determined that dilapidated fendering made
a berth unsafe. The panel specifically identified several hazards
created by the inadequate fendering system:42  "[T]he ship
pounded and surged against three remaining vertical pilings and
steel rods protruding from the concrete pier. '43 According to the
panel, "[t]he most damage was caused by the piling located at the
transverse bulkhead between #3 and #4 hatches which protruded
further away from the pier than the others and acted as a pivot
around which the vessel turned.""4
3. UNCHARTED TERRITORY
Although many principles governing the meaning of safe port
provisions are well-established, 5 there remains ample opportunity
for parties to a charter to disagree about whether particular condi-
tions are "safe" within the meaning of the law. For example, a
sandbar at the mouth of a port or berth may render either "un-
safe.' '6 This determination does not resolve the question whether
a temporary shoal formed by unusual weather and currents should
produce the same result.'7 Similarly, is a berth unsafe because a
S.M.A. No. 1054 (Arb. at N.Y. 1976).
38. Horn v. Christensen Canadian Enters. Ltd. (The S.S. Stadt Schleswig), 1971 A.M.C.
362 (Arb. at N.Y. 1970).
39. Id. at 365. The panel accordingly held that the high winds that damaged the vessel
did not render the port unsafe.
40. Esso Standard Oil, S.A. v. The S.S. Sabrina, 154 F. Supp. 720, 724 (D.C.Z. 1957).
41. 1977 A.M.C. 318 (Armed Servs. Bd. Contract App. 1976).
42. Id. at 331-33.
43. Id. at 332.
44. Id.
45. See generally TIME CHARTERS, supra note 4, at 86-89; Smith, supra note 3, at 870-
74 (explaining the generally accepted characteristics of a safe port).
46. See The Gazelle, 128 U.S. 474 (1888).
47. Cf. Neptune Maritime Co. v. Cook Indus. (The M.V. Naiad), S.M.A. No. 1177 (Arb.
(Vol. 36:465
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shoal will sometimes form in its entry at certain times of the
year?48 What should be the result if a temporary, permanent, or
recurring shoal partially, but not completely, obstructs the mouth
of a port or the entry to a berth?49 What if a rock formation, un-
derwater cables, or pipes partially obstruct the entry to a berth?50
Under these circumstances, the courts and arbitrators must deter-
mine what constitutes good navigation and seamanship and how
they may relate to a determination of whether a berth is unsafe.
Grounds for disagreement are not limited to issues concerning
safety in arrival and departure from a berth; difficult questions
concerning use of a berth also remain unanswered. Although bad
weather does not ordinarily render a berth "unsafe," 5' seasonal
storms, which are somewhat predictable, may result in disagree-
ment over a berth's safety.2 The adequacy of fendering around a
berth can also raise thorny issues. For example, is a berth without
fendering safer than one with inadequate fendering?53 If a failure
to install fendering was sufficient to give rise to liability, then most
ports in many parts of the world would be deemed "unsafe" and
safe port provisions would become a trap for the unwary charterer.
Furthermore, it is not clear how much fendering is necessary to
make a berth safe5 ' or how much scarring and abrasion a vessel
must sustain, beyond normal wear and tear, to support an owner's
claim for damages.
Determining whether a port or berth is "unsafe" as a matter of
law is only one of several questions that a court or arbitration
panel must consider when evaluating liability for port or dockside
damages. Liability and the apportionment of damages are also af-
fected by issues related to several warranty liability exceptions
borrowed from tort law.
at N.Y. 1977) (river known to have seasonal draft changes can be considered unsafe).
48. See id.
49. See The Gazelle, 128 U.S. 474 (1888) (permanent shoal across entry to harbor un-
safe for a vessel that cannot cross it).
50. See Mencke v. A. Cargo of JaVa Sugar, 187 U.S. 248 (1902) (bridge under which a
vessel cannot pass renders port unsafe).
51. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Appeal of the United States Lines, 1977 A.M.C. 318 (Armed Servs. Bd. of
Contract App. 1976) (port can be unsafe due to faulty fendering and unusual, but not un-
foreseeable, winter winds).
53. See, e.g., id.
54. See, e.g., Appeal of the United States Lines, 1977 A.M.C. 318 (Armed Servs. Bd.
Contract App. 1976) (berth with wooden fendering unsafe when deteriorated vertical fender
piles led to damage of vessel).
1982]
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III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE SAFE BERTH WARRANTY
Judicial and administrative decisions recognize four exceptions
to the contractual safe berth warranty: assumption of risk," inter-
vening negligence," avoidance by good navigation and seaman-
ship,67 and comparative or mutual fault.'8 Although the courts and
arbitration panels treat each of these defenses differently, they are
all based on the owner's or master's ability to avoid or mitigate the
loss."
A. Assumption of Risk
If a charterer shows that a shipowner has "assumed the risk"
of unsafe berth conditions, he may shift liability entirely to the
shipowner for losses arising from the berth conditions.6 In
Tweedie Trading Co. v. New York & Boston Dyewood Co.," for
example, the court held a vessel's owner fully responsible for dead
freight charges incurred when the charterer refused to load the full
cargo because the ship would have been unable to cross a sandbar
fifty miles downriver. 2 Because the owner possessed complete in-
formation regarding the depth of the river, the court determined
that the vessel assumed all risks attending her movement to and
from the port of loading.6 In another instance of liability-shifting,
in Pan Cargo Shipping Corp. v. United States" the shipowner,
rather than the charterer, was held liable for losses incurred when
the Saudi Arabian government prohibited the vessel from entering
55. See infra text accompanying notes 60-73.
56. See infra text accompanying notes. 74-88..
57. See infra text accompanying notes 89-101.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 102-117.
59. Recognition of the exceptions implies that the courts and arbitrators do not fully
adhere to the view that a safe berth provision imposes on the charterer an absolute contrac-
tual duty to provide a completely safe berth. The owner's liability arises because the courts
and arbitrators interpret the safe berth provision as merely exonerating the owner from any
duty to berth the vessel anywhere the master deems unsafe. See Bunge Corp. v. MN Fur-
ness Bridge, 558 F.2d 790, 801 (5th Cir. 1977) (dicta), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978).
60. See Tweedie Trading Co. v. New York & Boston Dyewood Co., 127 F. 278 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 193 U.S. 669 (1903); Pan Cargo Shipping Corp. v. United States, 234 F. Supp.
623 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 373 F.2d 525 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 836
(1967); Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece (The Atlantis), S.M.A. No. 788 (Arb. at
N.Y. 1972); Consorico Naviera Peruana, S.A. v. Amerop Corp. (The Zaneta), 1970 A.M.C.
807 (Arb. at N.Y.).
61. 127 F. 278 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 193 U.S. 669 (1903).
62. Id. at 279.
63. Id. at 280.
64. 234 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affd per curiam, 373 F.2d 525 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 836 (1967).
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the port of Ras Tanura, where it was to load a cargo of oil. The
Saudis barred the ship after it had previously visited Israeli ports,
in violation of a boycott imposed by several Arab states." Af-
firming the decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ob-
served, "While this possibility was known to the shipowner it was
not known to the charterer; the risk of the denial of pratique was
thus on the owner." 66
Arbitrators also invoke the doctrine of assumption of risk. In
The Zaneta,67 for example, a panel of arbitrators held that the
charterer was not liable for grounding damages sustained by the
ship at the named port of Buenaventura because the shipowners
had "knowledge of the conditions," and therefore, "entered into
the charter at their own risk."" The panel observed that the ship-
owners "could have instructed the Captain to load cargo only until
the vessel would obviously ground then remove the vessel from the
berth awaiting Charterers' instructions or, alternatively, sail and
claim dead freight." 69
These decisions demonstrate that it is difficult to predict accu-
rately when courts or arbitrators will invoke assumption of risk to
override a charterer's warranty liability. The analysis in Pan Cargo
correctly suggests that assumption of risk should apply only when
a shipowner has knowledge of a specific risk unknown to the char-
terer.70 Otherwise, a charterer could negate any protection that a
safe berth provision affords a shipowner merely by showing that
the shipowner had some general knowledge of the risks involved.71
Nevertheless, all decisions do not follow this reasoning. In Tweedie
Trading Co., the court did not consider whether the charterers also
were aware of the hazards involved. 2 Moreover, the charterers in
The Zaneta knew or should have known of the risk, but the panel
held the owners liable for the loss.73
65. Pan Cargo, 373 F.2d 525, 525 (2d Cir. 1965), afg per curiam 234 F. Supp. 623
(S.D.N.Y.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 836 (1967).
66. Id.
67. Consorico Naviera Peruana, S.A. v. Amerop Corp. (The Zaneta), 1970 A.M.C. 807
(Arb. at N.Y.).
68. Id. at 808.
69. Id.
70. Because the owners "knew the facts as to the voyage ... to Israel and ... deliber-
ately took the risk thereby created," imposing liability on the owners is "the fair and equita-
ble decision." Pan Cargo, 234 F. Supp. at 634.
71. This is somewhat ironic because a shipowner's knowledge of potential hazards may
have prompted him to bargain for a safe berth clause.
72. 127 F. 278, 280 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 193 U.S. 669 (1903).
73. 1970 A.M.C. 807, 808 (Arb. at N.Y.).
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B. Intervening Negligence and Avoidability by Good
Navigation and Seamanship
These exceptions focus on the master's or captain's conduct of
a vessel. The courts discuss the captain's role in terms of "inter-
vening negligence ' 74 while the arbitrators refer to "avoidability by
good navigation and seamanship. 7' These differences in terminol-
ogy reflect meaningful differences in the standards actually
applied.
The intervening negligence doctrine was discussed in Ameri-
can President Lines v. United States.7 ' In that case, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California over-
turned a decision rendered by the Armed Services Board of Con-
tract Appeals. The Board had found the charterer liable for dam-
ages sustained while the vessel was moored at an unsafe berth in
high winds, but not responsible for additional damages occurring
after the master departed the berth in an attempt to prevent fur-
ther damage by anchoring in a nearby bay." Although the Board
found that the charterer breached the charter party agreement by
directing the ship to unload at an unsafe port, it also reasoned that
the master acted unreasonably because high winds prevailing in
the area created a foreseeable risk of harm if the vessel was trans-
ferred to the bay. 8 In addition, the Board found that the master
could have steered clear of the unfavorable weather altogether and
consequently, the intervening negligence of the master in moving
the vessel broke the chain of causation and shifted liability to the
shipowner for those damages that occurred after the ship left its
berth.7
In rejecting the Board's holding and deciding instead that the
charterer was liable for all damages, the district court focused on
the "difficult dilemma" confronting the captain when the charterer
directs the vessel to a port that the captain believes is unsafe.80 A
captain who refuses to comply runs the risk of a later determina-
tion that the port was safe. On the other hand, a captain who at-
tempts to comply with the order runs the risk of a miscalculation.81
74. See infra text accompanying notes 76-88.
75. See infra notes 89-101 and accompanying text.
76. 208 F. Supp. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
77. Id. at 575.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 576.
81. Id.
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The court reasoned that when a charterer places a captain in this
dilemma, a court should not burden him with the entire responsi-
bility for the vessel's safety. In the court's view, if the captain at-
tempts to comply with the charterer's directive, it would be inequi-
table to relieve the charterer of liability for harm caused by the
charterer's wrongful demand merely because the captain's choice
of alternatives proves incorrect." The court concluded that the
charterer is liable for the consequences of his breach of contract
unless the course followed by the captain is so imprudent that it
constitutes an intervening act of negligence. 88 This principle re-
quires the captain to do more than merely make a decision involv-
ing some foreseeable risk of harm. "To constitute an intervening
act of negligence," the court stated, "the course followed by the
captain must entail an unreasonable risk of harm.' ' "
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
Venore Transportation Co. v. Oswego Shipping Corp.,8" also es-
tablished a stringent test to prove intervening negligence. In Ve-
nore the charterers alleged intervening negligence. The master re-
lied on the charterer's agent's assurance that it was "all right" to
enter a berth where only one of two pontoons remained.8 The
court stated that "even had no assurances been given, the charter
party was itself an express assurance that the berth was safe, upon
which the Master had a right to rely."87 Indeed, this decision may
reach beyond the standard of unreasonable risk that the court in
American President Lines required in order to constitute an inter-
vening act of negligence. The Venore court indicated that an owner
is insulated from liability, even if the risk taken by the captain is
unreasonable, when the charterer provides an express assurance of
safe berth, which may consist of nothing more than a warranty
clause in the charter party itself.88
In contrast to the courts, arbitration panels have adopted less
rigorous standards for establishing intervening negligence.89 The
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 498 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974).
86. Id. at 471.
87. Id. at 472.
88. Id. at 473.
89. See, e.g., San Cecilio Cia. Nay., S.A. v. Greenwich Marine, Inc. (The M.V. Sifnos),
S.M.A. No. 1252 (Arb. at N.Y. 1978); Europa Shipping Corp. v. Amerop Corp. (The S.S.
Marathonian), S.M.A. No. 1166 (Arb. at N.Y. 1977); Hyman-Michaels Co. v. Westminster
Corp. (The M/V Preveza), S.M.A. No. 870 (Arb. at N.Y. 1974) (interim award).
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arbitrators abandon the distinction between a foreseeable and an
unreasonable risk of harm. Instead, the arbitrators simply inquire
whether the danger involved "cannot be avoided by good naviga-
tion and seamanship." 90 Not surprisingly, this analysis yields re-
sults very different from the judicial approach previously
described.91
In The S.S. Marathonian, a shipowner sought to recover dam-
ages when a growing swell in the harbor, emanating from hurri-
canes at sea, damaged a vessel at berth.92 The Society of Maritime
Arbitrators found that the port and berth at Manzanillo, Mexico,
where the vessel was damaged, were safe in normal weather. Be-
cause the vessel's owner accepted named ports in the charter
party, the panel stated that "it was his responsibility to check on
them."" The panel reasoned further that the master could have
left the berth, anchored in the harbor, and returned to the dock
after the surging ceased.'4 The panel, therefore, concluded that the
charterers did not breach the safe port or berth warranty and held
the owner responsible for the damage to the vessel caused by the
master's negligence."
The panel in The M.V. Sifnoss" also relieved a charterer from
liability when the master's negligence damaged a vessel. The dam-
age occurred during a period of untoward weather while the ship
was at berth in Valparaiso, Chile.'7 In support of its conclusion,
the panel observed that the master had failed to make timely deci-
sions necessary for the vessel's safety. If the master had requested
tug assistance earlier or had left the berth, the panel reasoned,
then the damage would not have happened or would have been
minimal.'8
The decision in The M.V. Preveza" is also based on the
master's ability to avoid the damage. While arriving in Quebec
during inclement weather, the vessel dragged her anchor over un-
90. Europa Shipping Corp. v. Amerop Corp. (The S.S. Marathonian), S.M.A. No. 1166,
at 6 (Arb. at N.Y. 1977) (quoting The Eastern City, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 127 (1958)).
91. See supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
92. The S.S. Marathonian, S.M.A. No. 1166, at 4.
93. Id. at 6.
94. Id. at 5.
95. Id. at 6.
96. San Cecilio Cia. Nay., S.A. v. Greenwich Marine, Inc. (The M.V. Sifnos), S.M.A.
No. 1252, at 4 (Arb. at N.Y. 1978).
97. Id. at 3.
98. Id.
99. Hyman-Michaels Co. v. Westminster Corp. (The MV Preveza), S.M.A. No. 870
(Arb. at N.Y. 1974) (interim award).
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derwater communication cables.100 To free the ship, it was neces-
sary to cut the anchor chain and connect a new anchor. The arbi-
trators did not discuss whether the master undertook an
unreasonable risk. Rather, the panel held that the master's naviga-
tional error in inclement weather-and not the charterer's instruc-
tions to proceed to Quebec-caused the damages.10'
Thus, the courts and arbitrators apply different standards for
determining when the acts of the owner or his agent relieve the
charterer of liability under the charter party agreement. The
courts require more egregious conduct before shifting liability to
the owners. This divergence between the courts and arbitrators
does not exist with findings of mutual fault.
C. Mutual Fault
When charterers have breached a safe berth provision, both
courts and arbitrators occasionally are willing to apportion some
liability to the owners. This typically occurs when the owners had
prior knowledge of the hazards involved. 10 2
In Ore Carriers of Liberia, Inc. v. Navigen Corp.,0a for exam-
ple, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed a district court judgment dividing damages evenly between
the charterer and owner after the vessel crashed into some machin-
ery while navigating a river without tug assistance. The court ob-
served that both the owner and charterer had agreed that it would
be hazardous for the ship to navigate the Black River without tug
assistance. 104 Although the charterers had contractually warranted
the safety of port and this warranty was breached, the court rea-
100. Id. at 4.
101. The panel stated:
The charterers instructed the Master to proceed to Quebec without pilot
"weather permitting." The Master could and should refuse to comply, if he con-
sidered the venture to be dangerous. However, he reached Quebec safely without
pilot and the incident occured [sic] several hours after his arrival while he had
the benefit of expert advice by radiotelephone from the Pilot Station. Therefore,
the instructions of the Charterers were not the cause of the incident. The cause
of it was a typical error in navigation. . . for which the Master and Owners are
liable.
Id. at 8.
102. See, e.g., Ore Carriers of Liberia, Inc. v. Navigen Corp., 435 F.2d 549 (2d Cir.
1970); Appeal of the United States Lines, 1977 A.M.C. 318 (Armed Serva. Bd. Contract App.
1976); Oceanic Freighters Corp. v. Louis Dreyfus Corp. (The M.V. Oceanic First), S.M.A.
No. 1054 (Arb. at N.Y. 1976).
103. 435 F.2d 549 (2d Cir. 1970).
104. Id. at 550.
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soned that the shipowner had acted with full knowledge of the
probable unavailability of tug assistance." 5 In apportioning liabil-
ity, the court specifically found that the shipowner's vice president
had known before the voyage commenced that the ship, because it
was registered in Liberia, might be picketed and consequently,
that tug assistance was unlikely.106
Arbitration panels have also apportioned liability in a variety
of situations that would support a finding of mutual fault. In Ap-
peal of the United States Lines,'01 a panel of the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals found both the owner and the charterer
at fault. The owner alleged that the charterer had breached a safe
berth provision because the fendering system at the berth was seri-
ously deteriorated. Although the master had placed temporary
fenders between the vessel and the pier, " exposed pilings and
protruding steel rods damaged the ship.0 9 The panel found mutual
fault and apportioned liability between the parties." 0 Although the
hazardous condition of the berth was known to the charterer,"'
the panel pointed out that the hazard was also known, or should
have been known, to the shipowner and master of the vessel be-
cause they continually used the terminal."9 Reasoning that both
the shipowner and charterer should be held responsible for placing
the vessel in a situation where she sustained damage, the panel
ordered them to share liability for damages." 3
The M. V. Oceanic First"4 also illustrates the predisposition of
decisionmakers to mitigate the charterer's liability under a war-
ranty clause. In that case, a panel of the Society of Maritime Arbi-
trators stressed that both parties had prior knowledge of the ad-
verse weather conditions that ultimately caused injury to the
vessel. Each party had become familiar with both weather and
berth conditions after repeated calls to the port during a one-year
period." 5 Reluctant to allow a warranty of safe berth to become a
trap for the unwary charterer, the panel declared that the "owner's
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 1977 A.M.C. 318 (Armed Servs. Bd. Contract App. 1976).
108. Id. at 329.
109. Id. at 332.
110. Id. at 343.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Oceanic Freighters Corp. v. Louis Dreyfus Corp. (The M.V. Oceanic First), S.M.A.
No. 1054 (Arb. at N.Y. 1976).
115. Id. at 8.
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right to rely upon the safe port, safe berth warranties of the Con-
tract does not extend to their ignoring obvious unsafe and danger-
ous conditions that in all probability could exist." 116 The panel ac-
cordingly held that the owners and charterers must share
responsibility for damages."
D. Summary of the Exceptions
This survey demonstrates that the confusion inherent in the
ambiguous safe berth provisions is often exacerbated by the doc-
trines that courts and arbitrators have developed as exceptions to
warranty liability. It is impossible to predict when a reviewing
body will determine that the owner's intervening negligence or as-
sumption of risk completely eliminates the charterer's warranty li-
ability. Similarly, it is difficult to anticipate when the owner's prior
knowledge, navigational error, or mutual fault will reduce the char-
terer's liability. One point, however, is clear: the courts and arbi-
trators employ these doctrines to achieve equity. As a result, the
decisionmakers are inclined to override the charterer's warranty,
even if the parties expressly agreed to it, when notions of "fair-
ness" require that the owner be held liable for damages that he
should have foreseen or could have avoided.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR A MORE RATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
Safe berth provisions should achieve several easily identifiable
goals. The obligations that these provisions impose, like the obliga-
tions imposed under any statutory, judicial, or contractual pro-
nouncement, should be clear and subject to precise interpretation.
This would enable the persons governed by these provisions to
conduct their business affairs securely according to the require-
ments of law because they would be reasonably certain of the con-
sequences of their conduct. To achieve fairness, the courts and ar-
bitrators should interpret these provisions predictably and
consistently. Indeed, fairness requires the decisionmaker to con-
sider several frequently competing factors. These factors include
not only procedural fairness through evenhanded application, but
also substantive fairness through compliance with the intentions of
the parties as expressed by their contract, and the apportionment
of liability in accordance with their fault. A party's blameworthy
116. Id.
117. Id. at 9.
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actions or omissions should give rise to liability.1 '
The current law of safe berth provisions in charter party
agreements fails to establish clearly defined obligations in several
respects. The clauses themselves are often ambiguous and subject
to conflicting interpretations. 1 9 Furthermore, courts and arbitra-
tors do not apply the exceptions to the warranty liability of safe
berth provisions consistently or predictably. 120 When the courts or
arbitrators do invoke these exceptions, they appear to adjust their
terms in accordance with the desired outcome in a particular
case. '' Thus, for a charterer to establish an owner's liability, he
must prove that the owner either assumed an unreasonable risk of
harm or failed to use good navigation or seamanship in controlling
the vessel. 2 2 The decisions do not explain why the owner's knowl-
edge of a risk of harm will in some instances completely cut off a
charterer's liability by reason of assumption of risk, but will in
other instances merely reduce the charterer's liability on a deter-
mination of mutual fault.
In addition, these rules frequently contravene the express in-
tentions of the parties. The owner's knowledge of unsafe berth
conditions, for example, frequently overcomes a warranty provision
and distributes at least some liability to the owner, despite the
charterer's contractual agreement to assume complete responsibil-
ity for damage to a vessel at berth. In achieving these results,
courts and arbitrators demonstrate a regrettable disregard for the
intentions of the parties as expressed in their agreements. 23
In many respects, the failure of the courts and arbitrators to
develop clear rules that are consistently applied, or to respect the
intentions of the parties, as expressed in their contract, results
from their attempts to avoid the harsh consequences of the con-
ventional warranty interpretation. The charterer may be unfamil-
iar with the implications of these provisions since they arise from
the archaic concepts of traditional maritime law. In their attempts
118. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 16-21 (4th ed. 1971). In other words, "correc-
tive justice payments should be assessed against those guilty of flawed conduct." Blum &
Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi-Auto Accidents and General Deterrence, 34
U. Cm. L. REv. 239, 272 (1967).
119. See supra notes 5-25 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 60-101 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 76-101 and accompanying text.
122. Compare Pan Cargo Shipping Corp. v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 623, 634
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 373 F.2d 525 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 836 (1967)
with American President Lines v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 573, 576 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
123. See supra notes 102-117 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 36:465
SAFE BERTH PROVISIONS
to mitigate the inequity resulting from the traditional interpreta-
tion of these provisions, courts and arbitrators rely on loss-alloca-
tion devices to distribute liability between the parties.1 24 In allo-
cating losses, however, the decisionmakers use ad hoc
determinations that create confusion rather than promote cer-
tainty in maritime transactions.
Grant Gilmore and Charles Black, in their treatise on admi-
ralty law, have expressed dissatisfaction with the typical warranty
construction of safe berth and port provisions. 2 ' They argue that
the owners alone, and not the charterers, should be liable for port
and berth damages.2 6 The authors reason that the owner is in the
best position to avoid accidents or injuries to a vessel while in port
or berth because the vessel's master or captain controls navigation
and dockside handling. 12 7 Specifically, the authors observe that the
captain is "on the spot" and therefore may readily identify poten-
tial hazards.' 28 Furthermore, the captain is empowered to refuse to
enter a port or berth that he deems unsafe.12 9
Although the underlying premise of Gilmore and Black's anal-
ysis is correct, their reasoning is flawed. The authors correctly as-
sume that imposing liability on the party possessing the most in-
124. Id.
125. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 11.
It is quite inconsonant with the position of the parties, in the usual case, to
charge the charterer with the consequence of the master's having entered an
unsafe port or tied up at an unsafe berth. It is the master who ordinarily has the
best means of judging the safety of a port or berth, first because he is an expert
in navigation, furnished with aids thereto, secondly because he knows his vessel
(including its draft and its present trim), and thirdly because he is on the spot.
The charterer, on the other hand, need not be a nautical expert at all, knows
nothing about the vessel except its capacity, and normally is far from the scene
of decision as to safety; his designations of port and berth are made (and are
known to be made) on commercial rather than on nautical grounds.
Further, the master, by the very words of the usual clauses, is not obligated
to take his vessel to any unsafe port or berth. The very purpose of the clauses is
to free him of his obligation. Since these clauses can be and have been given this
meaning, it is by no means necessary that they be given the quite different
meaning of creating an affirmative liability of charterer to ship, in case of mis-
hap. Indeed, as just suggested, they might easily be read to contradict this latter
meaning, since they place it outside the charterer's power to force the master to
imperil the ship. If the charterer, by the clauses, is disabled from forcing the
ship into an unsafe place, then his designation of an unsafe berth can hardly be
said to cause the ship's going there.
Id. at 204-05 (emphasis in original).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 204.
129. Id. at 204-05.
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formation and control efficiently deters the occurrence of injuries
and minimizes costs.13 0 In particular, they correctly point out that
the owner's captain or master is in a position to avoid port and
dockside accidents or damages." ' Contrary to the authors' reason-
ing, however, charterers are also in a position to avoid damages
and frequently have as much information concerning, and control
over, the vessel's safety as do its owners. 3 2
Charterers are often familiar with the ports and berths in-
volved in the itinerary for which they charter a vessel. Frequently,
the charterer has used these ports as a source of company business
for extended periods of time. In fact, the charterer's familiarity
with port authorities, port personnel, and port and berth condi-
tions may exceed the owner's.'33 Indeed, the charterer may have
permanent employees stationed in the different ports of operation.
A charterer, therefore, may be more informed than the owner
about local weather conditions, compatibility of berth and vessel,
permanent or recurring obstructions in the area, necessity and
availability of tug assistance or other navigational aids, and the
competency of dockside personnel.38 Through business contacts
130. See infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., San Cecilio Cia. Nay., S.A. v. Greenwich Marine, Inc. (The M.V. Sifnos),
S.M.A. No. 1252 (Arb. at N.Y. 1978) (damage to vessel during a storm).
132. See, e.g., Oceanic Freighters Corp. v. Louis Dreyfus Corp. (The M.V. Oceanic
First), S.M.A. No. 1054 (Arb. at N.Y. 1976) (both owner and charterer knew, or should have
known, of dangers at port).
133. See, e.g., Astrovigia Compania Naviera S.A. v. Maritime Found. Ltd. (The T.T.
Michael), S.M.A. No. 1277 (Arb. at N.Y. 1978); Oceanic Freighters Corp. v. Louis Dreyfus
Corp. (The M.V. Oceanic First), S.M.A. No. 1054 (Arb. at N.Y. 1976).
134. For example, in The T.T. Michael, the arbitration panel observed:
Of particular interest and importance appeared to be a letter from the Chief
Pilot apparently having been sent to the Charterer's Agents PNOC some three
months prior to "MICHAEL'S" arrival. In this- letter the Pilots association de-
manded higher fees to dock vessels at MMIC because of the natural hazards
including strong flood and ebb and counter currents in that area, that often
spoiled a docking and generally comprised dangerous work for the pilots on a
heavily loaded large vessel.
S.M.A. No. 1277, at 5. In holding the charterer liable for damages incurred when an extraor-
dinarily strong countercurrent broke the vessel adrift from its berth, the panel ruled,
Evidence indicates that the Charterer did have prior knowledge of existing
dangerous physical conditions and anticipatory tidal problems at that terminal
because their own vessel had been there and their affiliate's employee had vis-
ited and reported in detail in November 1976 on the facility. Charterer must
have known something more about rip tides affecting vessels at this berth than
they acknowledge in this arbitration. Therefore Charterer was bound to amplify
on them and forewarn the Master or Owner to have an extra supply of mooring
lines and to deploy same in some superior manner an expert study might have
concluded as best to cope with excessive conditions that might arise.
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and professional affiliations, a charterer may be in the best posi-
tion to identify and secure the berths that meet its requirements in
the designated ports.
The charterer will also control the procedures to be used for
vessel loading and discharge.'35 For example, in "roll-on" and
"roll-off" carriage, the charterer's stevedores may use a variety of
methods to load and unload cargo. They may remove fendering
from a dock to position a vessel flush along the pier, thus facilitat-
ing the passage of cargo. This procedure can expedite cargo opera-
tions and eliminate the substantial risks of harm posed by a dilapi-
dated fendering system. The scarring and abrasion that results
from placing a vessel against a smooth concrete surface is often
preferable to the holes and dents that may result from placing a
vessel against a splintered and deteriorated fendering system with
exposed, protruding iron bolts.'3 6 Whatever the procedure selected,
the charterer often possesses sufficient information and control to
help avoid or mitigate dockside damages.137
Leading economists and legal scholars considering the appor-
tionment of liability for accidents have argued that the party with
sufficient information and control to prevent an accident should
bear the cost of damages resulting from the accident. 38 In charter
party agreements, both owners and charterers possess vital infor-
mation and exercise considerable control with respect to the avoid-
ance of port and berth damages. The charterer's knowledge of port
conditions and personnel and his control over cargo loading and
discharge operations may be especially relevant in evaluating
whether port and berth damages could have been avoided.'3 9
Id. at 9.
135. TIME CHARTERS, supra note 4, at 137-38.
136. See, e.g., Appeal of the United States Lines, 1977 A.M.C. 318, 324-25 (Armed
Servs. Bd. Contract App. 1976).
137. See id. at 325, 343.
138. G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 68-73 (1979).
139. See supra note 134. Commentators have argued that liability insurance seriously
erodes the incentive to avoid accidents because the adverse financial impact is diluted. See
Blum & Kalven, supra note 118, at 243. Marine insurance premiums, however, would surely
reflect the safe port or berth record, the specific locations covered by a charter, and any
measures adopted to forestall possible injuries. These measures could include stowage of
bumpers and fenders, plans for conscientious loading and discharge operations, previous
port and berth experience, quality of navigational equipment aboard the vessel, and ar-
rangements for assisting tugs or dockside personnel.
Although commentators have observed that a motorist who takes proper safety precau-
tions may nonetheless become involved in an automobile collision through the fault of an-
other motorist, id., that phenomenon has little applicability to port and berth accidents.
Maritime vessels, unlike automobiles, do not usually operate in congested traffic conditions
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Accordingly, this article proposes that owners and charterers
should be presumed equally liable for damages to a vessel at berth,
unless either one or both of the parties contributed to the damages
by their negligence. In that event, liability for damages should be
apportioned between the parties according to their comparative
fault. 140 Any liability for damages not caused by the fault of either
party should be distributed evenly between them.""
This proposal differs markedly from the recommendation of
Professors Gilmore and Black; 42 it recognizes the role of the char-
terer in assuring a safe berth. As a matter of public policy, it is
therefore more desirable because it is more efficient. This proposal
provides an incentive for charterers to use the information and
control they possess to prevent port and berth injuries and mini-
mize their associated costs. Simultaneously, it also provides an in-
centive for owners to avoid these injuries.
The courts and arbitrators could adopt this proposal by recon-
ciling two conflicting lines of cases. Recent cases have almost uni-
formly imposed liability on the charterer by adopting a warranty
construction of the language, "safely lie always afloat.' 43 On the
other hand, a line of earlier decisions, never overruled, supports
the view that the owners should bear the responsibility for safe
berth incidents because the vessel is under their immediate con-
trol. 44 Neither one extreme nor the other is likely to conform to
and the risk of harm is therefore largely limited to the parties to a charter and their agents.
140. The Supreme Court has specifically determined that liability for property damage
in a maritime collision is to be allocated among the parties in proportion to the comparative
degree of their fault, and that liability should be allocated equally only when the parties are
equally at fault or when it is not possible to measure their comparative fault. United States
v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975).
141. See id.
142. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
144. This line of cases has been identified and discussed by several commentators. See,
e.g., G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 11, at 205-07; Smith, supra note 3, at 863. The
major decision in this area is Atkins v. The Disintegrating Co., 2 F. Cas. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1868)
(No. 601), afl'd, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 272 (1873), in which the district court declared, "The
master is the navigator, presumed to know best the channel of the ports within the natural
range of the adventure, and the capacities of his vessel; and he is the proper person to
determine whether his vessel can or cannot enter any particular port." 2 F. Cas. at 79. On an
appeal taken on another ground, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge's decision:
In regard to the merits-after a careful examination of the record-we have
found no reason to dissent from the views of the learned district judge by whom
the case was heard. However full might be our discussion, we should announce
the same conclusions. They are clearly expressed and ably vindicated in his
opinion.
Atkins v. The Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 272, 299 (1873).
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the realities of maritime transactions or to the intentions of the
parties. Based on the holdings in these cases, and their reasoning,
the adjudicators could construct a centrist position designed to ac-
commodate and reconcile the divergent rulings.
Despite this reasoning, courts and arbitrators may be slow in
changing their interpretation of the standard safe berth provisions.
The parties to a charter, however, could adopt this proposal for
themselves by incorporating it into their agreement. The following
safe berth provision could serve as a model:
SAFE PORT AND BERTH. Owners and charterers of a vessel
shall be presumed liable in equal degree for any damages caused
to a vessel by reason of unsafe port or berth, in the absence of
fault by either or both parties causing the damages. In the event
damages are caused by the fault of either or both of the parties,
then liability for such damages shall be allocated among the par-
ties proportionately to the comparative degree of their fault, and
liability for any remaining damages caused by reason of unsafe
port or berth and not determined to be caused by the fault of
the parties will be allocated equally among the parties in accor-
dance with the presumption stated above.
This proposal has several advantages. Most importantly, it is
workable. The trend in arbitration decisions already is towards
findings of mutual liability, as an exception to the prevailing war-
ranty construction. This proposal is consistent with that trend-it
simply accomplishes the desired outcome more forthrightly and di-
rectly than the other alternatives. In contrast to Professors Gil-
more and Black's conclusion that the vessel owner alone should be
presumed liable,145 this proposal does not entail a dramatic and
abrupt departure from recent case law. Being consistent with cur-
rent doctrine, it is also likely to comport with the expectations of
the parties.
In addition, a rule that presumes both parties equally liable
for damages not specifically shown to be the fault of either party is
simple, easily understood, and subject to consistent application.
Moreover, the proposed rule is fair because it distributes liability
rationally on the basis of fault or the possession of information and
The liability of the charterer was likewise limited in Hastorf v. O'Brien, 173 F. 346 (2d
Cir. 1909). In Hastorf the Second Circuit explained that the charterers "did their full duty
when they sent the scow only to a place where their own vessel had lain in safety under
similar conditions but a few days before. As men of ordinary prudence they might well have
concluded that [the] place was safe." Id. at 347.
145. See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
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control. The courts and arbitrators will therefore be disinclined to
invoke ancillary doctrines such as "assumption of risk" or "poor
navigation." Courts and arbitrators usually rely on these doctrines
to mitigate the harsh consequences of irrational or unfair rules.
Not only is the proposal more consistent with the parties' intuitive
expectations, it also avoids the misleading or unrealizable legal ex-
pectation that the charterer alone will be held liable for damages
that the current rules foster. Under this proposal adjudicators still
will have discretion in determining what constitutes fault and in
apportioning liability, but the discretion will not appear to be un-
bounded. The adjudicators no longer will search in the interest of
fairness for instances of mutual fault, override the parties' war-
ranty provision, and divide damages evenly.
Finally, this proposal serves the public interest because it is
efficient. It provides the parties with the proper incentives to use
their information and control to reduce the frequency and severity
of damages to vessels at berth. Neither party would be enticed into
complacency on the assumption that the other party will pay. Nor
would the parties gamble on the uncertainties of litigation; rather,
they would negotiate and settle on the basis of a clear and rational
contractual agreement or rule of law.
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